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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jose Luis Zepeda appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and from the district court's denial 
of his motion to reconsider. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Zepeda was charged with grand theft by possession of stolen property for 
possessing a stolen vehicle. (#37093 R. vol. II, pp. 265-66.) Part II of the 
Information alleged that Zepeda was a persistent violator. (#37093 R., vol. II, pp. 
268-70.) Zepeda agreed to plead guilty to the grand theft charge pursuant to a 
plea agreement wherein the state agreed to dismiss the persistent violator 
enhancement and to recommend a sentence of no more than eight years with 
three years fixed. (#37093 R., vol. II, pp. 283-85.) After Zepeda was unable to 
lay a sufficient factual basis for the crime, the district court accepted Zepeda's 
plea as an Alford plea, relying on the probable cause affidavit and Zepeda's 
attorney's remarks to provide the factual basis. (#37093 R., vol. !I, pp. 289-91; 
7/27/09 Tr., p. 8, L 24 - p. 13, L 21.) 
The district court sentenced Zepeda to eight years with three years fixed, 
to run concurrently with sentences in two other unrelated cases. (#37093 R., vol. 
ii, pp. 294-95, 305-·iO.) Zepeda's conviction was affirmed on appeai in an 
unpublished opinion. State v. Zepeda, Docket Nos. 37093, 37133 & 37134, 2010 
Unpublished Opinion No. 589A (Idaho App. September 8, 2010). 
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On February 5, 2010, Zepeda filed a pro se petition for post-conviction 
relief challenging his conviction (R., pp. 1-10), and the district court appointed 
counsel to represent him (R., p. 20). In his petition and supporting affidavit 
Zepeda alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel and that 
evidence existed of material facts not previously presented. (R., pp. 1-4.) His 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim included seven components: (1) his 
attorney failed to contact Brian Card, a potential witness; (2) his attorney failed to 
arrange a polygraph test; (3) his attorney failed to withdraw as counsel upon 
request; (4) his attorney failed to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea upon 
request; (5) his attorney failed to conduct adequate pretrial investigation; (6) his 
attorney failed to develop an adversarial or fighting attitude; and (7) his attorney 
failed to develop effective rapport with Zepeda. (R., pp. 4, 10.) In support of his 
claim of evidence of material facts not previously presented, Zepeda asserted a 
letter existed. (R., p. 2.) However, he did not explain how this letter, not included 
with his petition, entitled him to post-conviction relief. (See R., p. 2.) 
The state filed an answer and a motion for summary dismissal (R., pp. 21-
24, 26-36), to which Zepeda responded with an affidavit and brief (R., pp. 47-62). 
,l'IJtached to his affidavit was a letter purporting to be written by Brian Card; dated 
October 22, 2009, in which Brian Card professed his belief in Zepeda's 
innocence based on Card's lack of "knowledge of the vehicle not being legal, 
thus making it impossible for jose [Zepeda] to commit the acts aiieged against 
him." (R., p. 61.) Zepeda also attached a letter from his former attorney, dated 
January 12, 2010, which read in relevant part: "We are in receipt of your January 
2 
6, 2010 letter regarding withdrawing your guilty plea. In spite of it all, you still 
wanted to enter a voluntary plea. On what basis is it not a voluntary plea?" (R., 
p. 60.) 
The court granted the state's motion without a hearing and summarily 
dismissed Zepeda's petition. (R., pp. 63-69.) Zepeda filed a motion to 
reconsider (R., pp. 71-80), which was denied (R., pp. 81-82). Zepeda timely 
appealed. (R., pp. 85-88.) 
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ISSUES 
Zepeda states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was summary dismissal improperly granted when Mr. 
Zepeda raised a genuine issue of material fact that counsel had 
rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to move to 
withdraw an Alford plea, a motion that would have been supported 
by both an assertion of innocence by Mr. Zepeda as well as 
independent evidence from Mr. Card? 
2. Was the motion to reconsider improperly denied given that 
the motion for summary dismissal should not have been granted in 
the first place? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Zepeda failed to establish the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing Zepeda's petition for post-conviction relief? 
2. Has Zepeda failed to show that the district court abused its 




Zepeda Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Zepeda asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his petition for 
post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. He asserts that his petition 
and supporting materials presented a genuine issue of material fact both as to 
his claim of evidence of material facts not previously presented and his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney's purported failure to file a 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Appel.lant's brief, pp. 9-13.) Zepeda's claims 
fail. Because he failed to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel on either prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 
(1984 ), he has failed to show error. Further, Zepeda failed to support his newly 
discovered evidence claim with any citation to authority or argument and it is 
waived on appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from the summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
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exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
C. Zepeda Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction 
relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain 
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a 
complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 8). 
The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and 
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations. !sL (citing I.C. § 19-
4903). Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application 
must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary 
hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); 
Cowger v. State, 132 !daho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct .App. 1999) 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction appiicant must 
present evidence establishing a ptima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
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140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises 
no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims. 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a 
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept 
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 
P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001 )). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, 
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing 
the petition. kl (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 
(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting 
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." kl 
1. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim 
In his petition, Zepeda alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
file a motion to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing. (R., p. 8.) He asserted, "I 
asked him to withdraw my plea because I wanted to go to trial.... [P]rior to 
sentencing I moved to withdraw the plea and according to the attorney the court 
would not grant such a motion." (Id.) In support of his claim he later attached a 
letter from his former attorney, which read, "We are in receipt of your January 6, 
7 
2010 letter regarding withdrawing your guilty plea. In spite of it all, you still 
wanted to enter a voluntary plea. On what basis is it not a voluntary plea?" (R., 
p. 60.) The district court summarily dismissed this claim, concluding: 
Withdrawal of a properly entered guilty plea is "not an 
automatic right and more substantial reasons than just asserting 
legal innocence must be given." State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 
486, 861 P.2d 51, 56 (1993) (overruling State v. Jackson, 96 Idaho 
584, 532 P.2d 926 (1975)). Mr. Zepeda has failed to provide 
substantial reasons beyond his assertion of legal innocence that 
would warrant a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. He has not 
shown that his attorney's refusal to file the motion was conduct that 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that there 
was a reasonable probability that such a motion would have been 
granted. 
(R., p. 68.) 
Zepeda has failed to show that the district court erred. On appeal, he 
asserts: 
[T]he "more substantial reasons than just asserting legal 
innocence" were present. Mr. Zepeda asserted his actual 
innocence as he had done from the beginning and continued to do 
so through his sentencing hearing and in his petition for post-
conviction relief. But, in addition, as demonstrated by the letter 
from Mr. Card, Mr. Zepeda could have produced a witness who 
would testify to his innocence. Mr. Zepeda did not just have his 
own assertion of innocence, he had a defense and a witness to 
testify to that defense to present to a jury. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 13.) This argument fails. 
To show that counsel was ineffective a petitioner must prove both deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 
( 1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong 
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presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P .2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have 
been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 
(1988); Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
A claim that counsel should have made a particular motion is properly rejected 
on both prongs of this test if the motion would have been denied by the trial 
court. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642,646 (Ct. App. 1995). 
As an initial matter, on appeal Zepeda asserts this Court should find the 
Strickland prejudice analysis is not applicable to his claim. (Appellant' brief, p. 
12.) He claims, 
the decision to plead guilty laid with Mr. Zepeda. In refusing to act 
on Mr. Zepeda's request to move for withdrawal of the Alford plea 
prior to sentencing, counsel took that decision from Mr. Zepeda. 
Just as in the right to testify cases and the appeal cases, this Court 
should find that the Strickland prejudice analysis is not applicable. 
See Florida v. Nixon, supra. Rather, prejudice is established by the 
loss of the opportunity to move for withdrawal of the plea. As in 
Ricca, this Court should find that a genuine issue of material fact 
had been raised and vacate the summary dismissal of the petition. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12.) This contention is without merit. Zepeda cites 
several cases in which prejudice 'vVas presumed. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-12.) 
However, in each of those cases the defendant was denied a basic constitutional 
trial right. As noted by Zepeda, basic trial rights include "whether to plead guilty, 
waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal." (Appellant's 
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brief, pp. 10-11, citing Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187, 125 S.Ct. 551, 560 
(2004) (internal quotes and citations omitted).) A motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
is not included within those basic trial rights. In fact, "withdrawal of a 
presentence guilty plea is not an automatic right, and the defendant has the 
burden of proving that the plea should be allowed to be withdrawn." State v. 
QQQQ, 124 Idaho 481, 485, 861 P.2d 51, 55 (1993). Because a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea is not an automatic right, an attorney's alleged failure to file 
a motion to withdraw a plea is evaluated under a full Strickland analysis where 
prejudice is not presumed and must be proven. 
An Alford plea may not be withdrawn based upon a claim of actual 
innocence "in cases where there is some basis in the record of factual guilt." 
State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 486, 861 P.2d 51, 56 (1993) (emphasis added). 
"In determining whether a factual basis for a guilty plea exists, we look to the 
entire record before the trial judge at the time the plea was accepted." State v. 
Ramirez, 122 Idaho 830, 824, 839 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis 
added). Thus, it is proper for a court to look at the transcript of a probable cause 
hearing for the factual basis of a guilty plea. Fowler v. State, 109 Idaho 1002, 
1005, 712 P.2d 703. 706 (Ct. Aoo. 1985) (relvina on oreliminarv hearina 
I ' l I / , -' ._, o ~ -
transcript and PSI for factual basis for plea where defendant denied intent after 
entering plea). 
Applying the petitioner's burden of presenting evidence in support of post-
conviction claims and the presumption of competency by counsel to the facts 
alleged by Zepeda shows that he presented no viable claim of ineffective 
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assistance of counsel in failing to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
because the motion would have been denied. At the guilty plea hearing the trial 
court inquired of the parties about the factual basis for the plea. At that time, 
Zepeda explained, "I trusted a friend that I shouldn't have trusted, especially after 
getting off a rider and all that and knowing everything that I had just learned from 
the rider." (7/27/09 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 5-7.) His attorney, Mr. Byington, clarified the 
factual basis: 
He was incarcerated with an individual and two other 
detainees. They got out and he was in a vehicle with them and 
they came, and they left and the vehicle was still there. He had the 
key and the key was hidden. The police officers asked him about 
his knowledge of the vehicle, he gave them a story that didn't fit, so 
there's quite a bit of facts that the State would have used to prove 
this case against him. 
There were letters in the vehicle written by the one that was 
still in jail, telling him to take it back and give him a piece of the 
action, or some of the cash because he needed cash. So there's 
indications that he knew or should have known because of those 
letters about the status of the vehicle. 
(7/27/09 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 1.) After further questioning from the district court, the 
district court explained that it did not think it could accept the plea at that time. 
(7/27/09 Tr., p. 11, L. 17.) In response, Zepeda immediately told the court, "Your 
Honor, ! want to p!ead guilty to the charge. I should have known that the car was 
stolen I did not take the steps to find out that it wasn't, based on - like I said, all 
I was trying to do was get back to Rupert." (7/27/09 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 18-21.) Mr. 
Byington interjected and requested that Zepeda be allowed to make an Alford 
plea. (7/27/09 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 22-23.) He explained, "[Zepeda] certainly believes 
that the plea is in his best interest and he wants to accept the offer and plea 
11 
that's been offered to him. So, I mean, it's a close call." (7/27/09 Tr., p. 11, L. 23 
-p.12,L.1.) 
The district court noted that it had read the probable cause affidavit 
(7/29/09 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 5-8), which read in relevant part: 
I advised [Zepeda] that the vehicle was stolen. He [Zepeda] 
told me that he and Brian had just gotten out of Ada County Jail. 
Brian having been released June 2, 2009 picked him [Zepeda] up 
when he was released on the 4th . Brian then drove Jose [Zepeda] 
to Rupert in the vehicle yesterday and left the vehicle at Jose's 
residence but did not stay with Jose. He said that Brian went to 
Pocatello today (June ih) with his girlfriend and two other guys. 
When I asked Zepeda if he knew where the keys were to the 
vehicle he went into the residence, and underneath a decoration 
retrieved the key. He handed it to me. 
Dispatch located the whereabouts of Brian R. Card. He was 
incarcerated in the Ada County Jail. He had been there since 
approximately 0030 hours May 31, 2009. I detained Jose [Zepeda] 
for possession of stolen property. When it was confirmed that Brian 
had been incarcerated during the time Jose claimed to have been 
with him I placed him under arrest and took him to jail for 
Possession of Stolen Property IC 18-2403(4)(F), a Felony Parole 
Officer also filed an agents [sic] warrant for this offense. 
I am requesting that this report is forwarded to Prosecution 
to review the evidence of hand written letters to "Perro" Zapeda 
[sic] from Brian Card discovered in the vehicle the letter's [sic] 
clearly say the vehicle is stolen and not to get caught with it. 
(#37093 R. vol. I, pp. 233-34). The district court also noted that it had "heard 
what Mr. Byington has said about the circumstances of the case." (7/27/09 Tr., 
p. 13, Ls. 7-8.) It asked Mr. Byington if he objected to the court using the 
probable cause affidavit to establish a factual basis for the charge. (7 /27 /09 Tr., 
p. 13, Ls. 9-11.) Mr. Byington had no objection. (7/27/09 Tr., p. 13, L. 12.) 
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The probable cause affidavit coupled with Mr. Byington's remarks 
provided a sufficient factual basis for the guilty plea. Because the probable 
cause affidavit provided a factual basis for the plea and was in the record before 
the court, any motion challenging the factual basis for the plea would have failed. 
QQ!:m, 124 Idaho at 486, 861 P.2d at 56; Ramirez, 122 Idaho at 824, 839 P.2d at 
1248. Because a motion to withdraw Zepeda's plea lacked merit and would have 
been denied, his attorney was not deficient for failing to pursue it. Concomitantly, 
Zepeda could not have been prejudiced by his attorney's failure to pursue the 
motion. 
Zepeda also claims that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion to withdraw his plea because, "as demonstrated by the letter from Mr. 
Card, Mr. Zepeda could have produced a witness who would testify to his 
innocence." (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) This claim is without merit. "[D)enial of 
factual guilt is not a just reason for later withdrawal of the plea, in cases where 
there is some basis in the record of factual guilt." QQQQ, 124 Idaho at 486, 861 
P.2d at 56. The letter from Brian Card does not change this analysis. Because a 
factual basis for the plea was in the record, any motion to withdraw Zepeda's 
plea on the grounds that he was innocent lacked merit. Thus; Zepeda's attorney 
could not have been ineffective for failing to file a motion to withdraw Zepeda's 
plea that would have been denied. 
Because Zepeda failed to present evidence esiablishing a prirna facie 
case that trial counsel was deficient in his failure to file a motion to withdraw his 
13 
plea or that had he filed such a motion, the motion would have been granted, he 
was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim. 
2. Newly Discovered Evidence Claim 
Zepeda asserts that the district court erred rn dismissing his newly 
discovered evidence claim because he presented a genuine issue of material 
fact as to evidence of material facts not previously presented. (Appellant's brief, 
p. 9.) In his petition, Zepeda alleged, "There exists evidence of material facts not 
previously presented. To wit a letter." (R., p. 2.) Zepeda later attached a copy 
of the letter. (R., p. 57.) The letter is purportedly written by Brian Card who 
contends that Zepeda could not have been guilty of the crime because the 
person with prior possession of the vehicle (Card) assured Zepeda that the 
vehicle was "insured, registered, and one-hundred percent legal" and that he 
(Card) did not know that it was "not legal." (R., p. 57.) In dismissing this claim, 
the district court stated. 
In this case, Mr. Zepeda apparently knew of Mr. Card's 
statements and involvement at the inception of the case. Mr. 
Zepeda has not shown that this evidence was inaccessible or 
undiscoverable, even after an exercise of reasonable diligence. 
Therefore, the letter from Mr. Card is not "newly discovered" simply 
because ML attorney allegedly chose not to contact Mr. 
Card earlier in the case. 
Regarding the materiality of the proffered evidence, Mr. 
Zepeda pied guilty even after denying that he had the requisite 
mental state to commit the crime. The court initially refused to 
accept Mr. Zepeda's plea on this basis, but allowed him to enter an 
Alford plea when he continued to express his desire to plead guilty. 
The issue of whether Mr. Zepeda had the requisite mental state to 
commit grand theft by possession of stolen property was not tested 
at a trial, nor was it an issue once Mr. Zepeda determined that he 
would enter an Alford plea of guilty. Therefore, additional evidence 
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at this stage regarding his lack of knowledge that the property was 
stolen is immaterial and cumulative. Further, Mr. Zepeda has not 
shown that Mr. Card's letter would have affected the outcome of 
this case or that he would not have pied guilty if the letter had been 
presented earlier. 
(R., pp. 65-66.) 
On appeal, Zepeda asserts that he presented a genuine issue of material 
of fact as to "evidence of material facts not previously presented." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 9.) However, he fails to further discuss this claim in his brief. (See 
generally, Appellant's brief, pp. 8-14.) He only mentions the letter as it pertains 
to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Appellant's brief, p. 13 ("[l]n 
addition, as demonstrated by the letter from Mr. Card, Mr. Zepeda could have 
produced a witness who would testify as to his innocence.").) 
It is well established in Idaho law that an appellate court will not consider a 
claim of error that is not supported by both argument and citation to authority. 
State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 518, 164 P.3d 790, 798 (2007) ("Grazian makes 
no citation to authority as required by Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) and has not 
preserved the issue for appellate review"); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 
P.3d 739, 742 (2007) (claim not preserved for appellate review where "Diaz failed 
to present any argument or authority in his opening brief to support this 
contention"); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) 
("When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or 
argument, they wiil not be considered."). 
Zepeda asks this Court to grant him relief from the district court's order 
dismissing his newly discovered evidence allegation, but he has failed to support 
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his appellate claim that the district court erred in dismissing this allegation with 
either argument or citation to legal authority. (See generally, Appellant's brief, 
pp.8-14.) Because Zepeda offers no authority or argument in support of this 
claim, the claim is waived and must be disregarded. 
I l. 
Zepeda Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Denying His Motion To Reconsider 
Zepeda claims on appeal that his motion to reconsider was improperly 
denied. (Appellant's brief, p. 14.) Although Zepeda did not specify under what 
rule he was moving for reconsideration (see R., pp. 71-80), petitions for post-
conviction relief are civil matters and orders dismissing those motions may be 
reconsidered under I.R.C.P. 60(b). Granting or denying a motion to reconsider 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b) is within the discretion of the district court and upon 
appeal the decision will not be overturned without a finding of an abuse of 
discretion. Ade v. Batten, 126 Idaho 114, 117, 878 P.2d 813, 816 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Zepeda's motion 
to reconsider. Zepeda's petition for post-conviction relief failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted and therefore summary dismissal was proper. 
Zepeda's motion for reconsideration did not present any facts or a/legations that 
would have required the district court to reconsider its decision - it merely 
rehashed the allegations in his petition. (R., pp. 71-80.) As such, this Court 
should affirm the district court's denial of Zepeda's motion to reconsider. 
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CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
Memorandum Decision And Order Granting State's Motion For Summary 
Dismissal and its Order Denying Petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration. 
DATED this 10th day of August 2011. 
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